The frightening evolution of al-Qaida

‘Declaration of war’ on the United States
The 1998 fatwa was in the words of the 9/11 commission “a declaration of war” on the United States.  But more important, in the context of Setmariam Nasar’s argument, it set down the parameters of what the new al-Qaida needed. It was signed by bin Laden and Zawahiri, as well as the leader of another Egyptian terrorist group and Bangladeshi and Pakistani terrorists.  In the document, bin Laden called for a worldwide jihad on Americans, whether man, woman or child, military or civilian. Killing Americans became an individual duty of all Muslims everywhere, he wrote.

“We — with Allah's help — call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it,” bin Laden declared. “We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.”

The fatwa, with its call for individual, not organizational, responsibility, should be the driving force behind the new al-Qaida, it was decided. Al-Qaida had provided $80,000 to Indonesian terrorists to carry out the Bali nightclub bombings in Indonesia the month before. Now, a similar amount would be sent to Turkish terrorists who went after British and Jewish targets in two Istanbul attacks a year later. 

Other experienced fighters, working without orders from al-Qaida Central, planned and carried out al-Qaida-style multiple, simultaneous attacks on Western targets in Casablanca, killing 33 in May 2003. That attack, in turn, became the inspiration, again without direction from al-Qaida leaders, for the Madrid attack 10 months later.

Protecting home bases
It also did its best to help the remnants of the Taliban regain Afghanistan, as one U.S. counterterrorism official noted. “Home base is still very important for them.” Top al-Qaida leaders operated in small cells, attacking Afghan National Army and U.S. troops. Abu Laith al Libbi and Abu Hadi al Iraqi, two top bin Laden lieutenants, have been seen in recent months in Afghan combat videos distributed to Arab satellite TV channels to emphasize its importance.

Another home base is Saudi Arabia.  British intelligence picked up a lively debate between “al-Qaida in south Waziristan [Pakistan] and al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia” on the value of carrying out attacks on bin Laden’s native land, said a senior British counterterrorism official.  “Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia feared attacks would foul their own nest and that the Saudi government would react aggressively,” said the official. Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia lost the debate, and attacks against Western and Saudi targets began in Riyadh in May. The predicted response quickly followed, and al-Qaida lost most of its top leadership in Saudi Arabia and, more important, others who were responsible for bombings elsewhere.  In April 2005, Saudi officials discovered among the bodies of those killed in a shootout with their security forces the remains of Karim al Mojjati, the mastermind of the Casablanca attacks.

But the biggest success of the new strategy has been in Iraq.  Abu Musab al Zarqawi has created a mini-al-Qaida using all the hallmarks of bin Laden’s operations: the preference for multiple, simultaneous attacks, often using suicide bombers; high body counts; assassinations of “collaborators”; disregard for distinctions between military and civilian targets.

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