America has a great opportunity to change the world. Will it do it?

Isolationism is no better as an alternative. No country can escape the consequences of globalization. It is not simply that there is no hiding from globalization; it is also that the world cannot be expected to sort itself out without leadership, something only the United States can provide right now. Unlike Adam Smith’s economic model, there is no invisible hand ensuring that all works out for the best in the geopolitical marketplace.

Counterterrorism alone does not constitute an adequate foreign policy ambition for the United States. It is too narrow in scope and provides no guidance for dealing with a majority of the opportunities and challenges posed by globalization and international relations. Moreover, the surest way to address the threat of terrorism is integration. Only by integrating other countries into the struggle against existing and potential terrorism can the United States succeed. Promoting democracy is another potential foreign policy lodestar, one that appears to be the preferred approach of the second term of George W. Bush. “America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one,” the president proclaimed in his second inaugural address. “So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. . . .We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require the decent treatment of their own people. America’s belief in human dignity will guide our policies.”

It is, however, neither desirable nor practical to make democracy promotion a foreign policy doctrine. Too many pressing threats in which the lives of millions hang in the balance — from dealing with today’s terrorists and managing Iranian and North Korean nuclear capabilities to coping with protectionism and genocide — will not be solved by the emergence of democracy. Promoting democracy is and should be one foreign policy goal, but it cannot be the only or dominant objective. When it comes to relations with Russia or China, other national security interests must normally take precedence over concerns about how they choose to govern themselves. The fact that promoting democracy can be difficult and expensive also reduces its attraction as a foreign policy compass.

Integration can be a bold, transforming strategy by which the United States can shape the next era of history. This is an optimistic prospect, but one more modest in imagination than, say, someone writing amid World War II of a Europe in which Franco-German friendship is the cornerstone, or of someone writing in 1951 (the year I was born) of a post-Cold War, post-Soviet world in which markets and democracies are more the world’s rule than an exception. An integrated world can, with American guidance, become an achievable reality.

Some will see a risk that integration might prove too successful: Following an extended period of international calm, a much stronger China or Europe might then turn on the United States. Some analysts take such a risk seriously: “[T]he United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead. . . . A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” Here again, though, the strategy of integration offers reassurance. At its core is the ambition to give other powers a substantial stake in the maintenance of order — in effect, to co-opt them and make them pillars of international society — so that they will come to see it in their self-interest to continue working with the United States and damaging to their interests to have a falling-out with the United States. We are far more likely to face a disruptive major power down the road if we do not pursue the idea of integration.

This will not always be easy, particularly given the level of anti-Americanism that currently exists. It would be wrong, however, to view today’s sentiments as representing what might be described as a strategic choice by governments to counter the efforts of the United States throughout the world. Although some anti-Americanism can be attributed to natural resentment of a stronger country, the bulk of anti-American sentiment stems from disagreement over particular U.S. policies, especially the war against Iraq, the Palestinian issue and the perception in many quarters of uncritical U.S. support for Israel, and U.S. rejection of multiple international arrangements. The style and tone of American foreign policy during the first term of George W. Bush’s presidency has also had an impact. But much of today’s anti-Americanism need not be either structural or permanent. It is essential that policies and how they are promoted be adjusted. Anti-Americanism makes it more difficult for the United States to find useful and at times necessary partners. Even worse, over time, the perception that Americans do not have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind could bring to power individuals and governments around the world who view the United States as a threat that needs to be countered.

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