Should the U.S. negotiate with the Taliban?

Reaching out to moderate elements within the Taliban as part of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan-Pakistan has been the subject of much debate. Six experts weigh in on the merits of such a policy.

Earlier this month, President Obama proposed the controversial notion of reaching out to moderate elements of the Afghan Taliban.

The idea, favored by some experts and encouraged by Saudi Arabia's facilitation, has been pursued for months by the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. At the same time, as far back as 2004, the Pakistani leadership has cut deals with various insurgent groups, including the Pakistani Taliban.

But dealing with a group which harbored al-Qaeda before 9/11 and which has destabilized both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is a risky political and military strategy.

CFR.org asked six experts whether talks aimed at reconciling with moderate elements of the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan are a viable policy option for the United States.

Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia Center, The Atlantic Council of the United States
Engaging with the Taliban in Afghanistan is certainly a viable option for the United States, since it allows the United States to help isolate the extremist elements from those who feel compelled to join the Taliban insurgency under threat or in return for favors and largesse.

Importantly, by showing that it is willing to speak with the "enemy," the engagement could create a more positive view of the United States in local eyes. The United States must also try to separate the mujahadeen commanders, such as the Haqqanis and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, from the Taliban of Mullah Omar, since they are potentially rivals for power in Kabul.  This may involve use of tribal and Pakistani interlocutors who once worked with these commanders during the jihad against the Soviet Union.

The United States must not even try to enter into negotiations inside Pakistan. Instead, it can and should support Pakistani efforts to isolate the extremists inside that country by winning over the moderate populations in both the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the settled areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to wrest influence from the Pakistani Taliban.

This should not be done by ceding territory but by winning over the population. Direct injection of cash aid for community projects may be an effective method of winning friends in these areas. Low-profile collaboration with the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps to deliver resources from the CENTCOM Commander's Emergency Response Program may be one option. Building on the expertise of the Narcotics Affairs Section of the U.S. embassy in Pakistan and the Office of Transition Initiatives to start quick-impact projects that would benefit locals rapidly, the United States can help Pakistan break the stranglehold of the local Taliban over large swaths of FATA and the NWFP. Longer-term aid could then consolidate those gains.

Thomas H. Johnson, Director of the Program for Culture & Conflict Studies, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
An ongoing dialogue with the Taliban should be part of our counterinsurgency strategy, but such a venture is fraught with danger.

Since 2006, various partners of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan have pursued a dialogue with regional Taliban figures as well as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. None of these efforts have borne fruit. It's been difficult to identify who can in fact speak for the Taliban insurgent leadership. While these talks proceeded, the insurgency has become more violent and casualty rates have soared for the ISAF.

Not everyone believes in dialogue. The outside powers such as ISAF members the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Norway like the idea; regional powers such as Iran, India, and Russia oppose it.

Historically, Pashtuns (who constitute the core Taliban constituency) have negotiated only when they perceive themselves in a position of strength. If their public statements are to be believed, the Taliban today think they are in a position of strength. Taliban spokesman Qari Yousuf Ahmadi recently stated: "We struggle for almighty Allah and we are sure we are winning."

Those that support dialogue and negotiations believe that talks can split the insurgency between "moderates" and the extremist global jihadists. I am frankly unsure of who the moderate Taliban are. The structure of the Taliban is complex. The organizational structures at the local, provincial, regional, and national levels are not all necessarily tied together in a unified hierarchy and the political leaders (the Quetta shura, Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda) remain outside of Afghanistan.

I support the idea of a dialogue. We should start by reaching out to local Taliban leaders. This is a double-edged sword, since reaching out to these figures also potentially exposes us to dealing with criminals and corrupt politicians – in addition to the insurgent leaders. For long-term success, however, I think we need a process that starts at the local level that builds from the ground up.  Maybe this is the way to really identify leaders worth talking to.

While talk is a good idea, there are people to avoid. Negotiating with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a bad idea. He is a power-hungry, untrustworthy warlord bent on self-serving political aims, and he is highly unpopular throughout Afghanistan.

Another disaffected group already feeling marginalized by the Karzai regime is the warlords in the north (the so-called Northern Alliance). This group could cause major problems if concessions to the Taliban end up affecting their control in areas populated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks. It is believed 60 percent of the Afghan National Army is Tajik, many of whom are still loyal to warlord Gen. Mohammed Fahim. Reports of militias beginning to rearm in the north recently surfaced when rumors circulated that Karzai had offered concessions to Mullah Omar.

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