Dangers of dithering on Afghanistan decisions

As U.S. President Barack Obama and his top aides complete a study on U.S. operations in Afghanistan, the original coordinator of that policy, Bruce Riedel, warns of the consequences of delaying new action.

Riedel says at a time of squeamishness among U.S. partners and an increasingly emboldened Taliban and al-Qaeda, it is vital for the administration to avoid lengthy delays in deciding on a course of action and "convey determination" in its planning for the Af-Pak war theater. Riedel says the late spring replacement of the U.S. commander in Afghanistan delayed the release of an operational plan, and as a result, there is "some sticker shock at the size of what the operational plan calls for. That's the unfortunate reality."

In a recent interview with the CFR.org's Bernard Gwertzman, Riedel also says it is a "fairy tale" to think that the Taliban can be split off from al-Qaeda. He says that "at no point is there any serious evidence that Mullah Omar and the top Taliban leadership have been willing to give up Osama bin Laden and turn him over."

CFR.org's Bernard Gwertzman: President Obama is winding up an intensive review of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. You organized a similar review for the president which ended up in his speech on March 27 outlining a pretty dynamic policy towards both countries. What has caused the second review?

Bruce O.Riedel: The president was very clear, and correctly so, back in the winter that the policy he was going to embark on wouldn't be on autopilot. That is to say, we will not just blindly continue to follow a course forward.

He was clear then, and he's right now, to periodically take a look to judge what we're doing right; what we're doing wrong; what did we anticipate correctly; what's new that we didn't anticipate. And even on the question of the personnel on the team: Have we got the right people? Do we need someone else? From the beginning the president indicated to me and to his national security team that he would want to periodically revisit those questions. That makes a lot of sense. This is a very dynamic situation.

It's a situation which has deteriorated over the last six months in several ways. First, the military situation on the battlefield has gotten worse. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that just the other day: The momentum is with the enemy. And secondly, the political situation has gotten worse with the fiasco of the Afghan elections.

There's a delicate line, of course, between rethinking and dithering. And the president and his team are aware that they have to avoid the latter at all costs.

Among the ideas pushed forward is one that says that the Taliban is really not an enemy; al-Qaeda is the only enemy and so therefore it's not that necessary to defeat the Taliban. That would undercut the whole effort of boosting the Afghan military forces and increasing the military forces in Afghanistan. Is this a real competing idea right now?

This is a fairy tale. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have been closely aligned ever since Osama bin Laden came back to Afghanistan in the mid 1990s. The Taliban leadership under Mullah Omar has been unwilling to break with al-Qaeda for more than a decade. Ever since the two had their first meeting back in the nineties — which I would remind people was set up by the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI — these two have been in a partnership.

What is most remarkable about that partnership is that it has survived and endured when arguably the Taliban has been a big loser in this partnership. They lost the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. But at no point is there any serious evidence that Mullah Omar and the top Taliban leadership have been willing to give up Osama bin Laden and turn him over. And that really ought to be the bar on which we judge whether the Taliban is willing to enter into serious negotiations, not a promise that "if you leave, we'll be good boys," or that "we will break with al-Qaeda."

The other way to think about this is: We have a terrorist problem, al-Qaeda, which has become embedded in an insurgency, the Taliban. Of course, if we could somehow disembowel the terrorist problem from the insurgency, that would be a very good outcome. But there is nothing in the history of the relationship between these two movements over more than a decade now that suggests that is imminent, or likely.

This review has been going on for some time, and you've said that the president doesn't want to really be seen as dithering. Do you expect some decision-making soon?

At some point there is a cost to delay. And that cost comes in how our partners and how our enemies respond. Our NATO partners are already a bit squeamish. The Pakistanis are already beginning to wonder about the seriousness of the American commitment. So that undue delay has a cost.

Our enemies have already come to the conclusion that victory is in sight. We've had two remarkable statements from the enemy in the last fortnight. The first came from Mullah Omar, who said to his troops at the end of Ramadan: "Victory is in sight, stay united." And he said to the outside world, "Once the foreign occupation army leaves, we will settle the Afghan problem. We will recreate the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and we will harbor no grudges against you. Trust us, we'll be good boys."

A few days later, Osama bin Laden came out with a message to the people of Europe, and his message was short and simple: "The Americans are about to leave. They will let you down. You will end up being caught in Afghanistan alone with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and you don't want that. So get out before the Americans cut and run."

It's interesting these messages in many ways overlap. You can see a degree of coordination in the propaganda which is more sophisticated and subtle than we've seen in the past. I don't think this persuades many Europeans, Canadians, or Americans, but it's a very good insight into what our enemy thinks. They are confident that time is on their side, that they will defeat the Americans just like they defeated the Russians. And one of the most important things that the president and the administration have to do is convey seriousness, convey determination.

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