Hurting, not helping
No one with any sense of the critical strategic challenge of the Taliban and al Qaida insurgency in Afghanistan and its ability to destabilize Pakistan will argue for maintaining a constant force of 130,000 in Iraq. Nor will anyone sensitive to the negative impact of our presence in Iraq on sentiment across the Muslim crescent argue for staying any longer than absolutely necessary. In addition the need to recapitalize and rejuvenate our units demands a reduced operational tempo across the force.

But promises to withdraw in 16 months or to take out one to two brigades a month on a fixed schedule undermines our forces in the field in several ways. These limits inhibit an open, internal strategic dialogue at home that integrates both political and military factors in strategic decision. They also create a disincentive for Iraqi’s to make the often personally risky effort to compromise.

Before a decision on force levels, we must allow our commanders on the ground to make the argument for the best mix of forces to achieve success. Granted, generals are often sent away from these discussions to execute campaigns with capabilities that accept more risk than they would like. But in the language of the two democratic candidates, we see fixed numbers that in the first 100 days of an administration would preempt a realistic assessment of the military capability needed to support the process of Iraqi political accommodation that offers a political solution in Iraq that gives the best grounds for bringing the troops home.

Fixed dates for withdrawal complicate the problem. I recall a similar situation we encountered serving in Bosnia. Then-President Bill Clinton had announced the end point for U.S. presence in Iraq. In 1996 as we put pressure on Bosnian Serb generals to moderate their positions and draw down their forces, they reminded U.S. that the president had set a date certain for our departure. They would just wait the U.S. out. Faced with a similar situation, why would not the Iraqi factions simply follow the same plan?
Iraq war timeline
Key political and military moments since the 2003 invasion

Some lessons from Vietnam
Granted, our experience in Vietnam indicates that when the Vietnamese leaders saw that we were truly drawing down, they worked harder on their own capabilities to deal with the insurgency. But while we need our Iraqi partners to understand that they must find their own way to security and soon, fixed dates undermine the ability of our commanders and the ambassador to compel them to act in their own best interest. We must maintain the balance between the strategic and political impulses that compel reduction of forces as well as the practical realities on the ground that demand force presence.

The political will of the Americans to persist in this difficult campaign demands straight talk about these issues. It would be much better for an understanding by voters of the relevant issues in Iraq and Afghanistan and the larger Middle East if candidates and their interlocutors addressed the conditions of success in this campaign and avoided catchy statements about force levels and tactics that will certainly come back to haunt a new President once in office. Leave fixed timelines and force levels out of the debate. Give the U.S. a staged plan for achieving conditions of success, not simple formulas that appeal to some voters but do not present the difficult strategic realities.

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How can we best achieve a good peace as an end to a war of choice that went badly for too long?

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