Campaign rhetoric isn't always strategic reality
Opinion: Candidates' promises on the war are filled with flaws
![]() | A man walks past protesters of the 'Stop the War Coalition' who demonstrate at the Department of Defence in Sydney on March 20, 2008. |
ANOEK DE GROOT / AFP/Getty Images |
Most Popular |
| |||||
In his speech on Wednesday, the president reiterated his rationale for the Iraq war. After praising the conventional campaign in which our forces took Baghdad in a little over 16 days, he obliquely admitted the counterinsurgency campaign had not gone well until recently and that it had cost more than anticipated.
He underlined the “undeniable” gains of the “surge,” now that over 90,000 Iraqis had jointed the Awakening helping to defeat al-Qaida in Iraq. Throughout his speech, he praised the sacrifices and contributions of the troops. But we heard again the soaring and now bankrupt rhetoric about liberty as a transformative force in the Middle East, rhetoric that the majority of the public does not buy.
Web sites of our current presidential candidates reveal other dysfunctional errors in their own statements. Sen. Hillary Clinton, D-N.Y., promises that within 60 days in office, she will approve a plan to remove one to two brigades a month from Iraq. Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., states that on taking office he will begin immediately start to remove one to two brigades a month completing the withdrawal of all combat brigades in 16 months. Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., argues for winning in Iraq and has numerous speeches and releases to document that position. But he gives scant details how he plans to proceed.
None of this politically-inspired rhetoric realistically represents the forces that will affect eventual decision.
The so-called surge has created an opportunity. But we must remember the painstaking and lethal work that preceded it. This effort included training and upgrading Iraqi forces, forcing Moqtada Sadr to order his militias into a less aggressive stance, compelling Sunni rejectionists to back away from confronting our forces, and seriously damaging al-Qaida in Iraq. After very hard efforts by the units in the years that preceded it, the surge has yielded a temporary strategic opening we must exploit.
Click for related content |
But the arrangement that establishes the conditions for political accommodation between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites will not depend on the Neo Con idea of, “freedom yielding peace.” It will stem from a shared self-interest of Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites as they realize that a new normalcy depends fundamentally on a deal that invests control of some of their interests in national institutions. Those institutions include at a minimum the Armed Forces and National Police, a set of laws and an Oil Ministry that ensure equitable distribution of oil wealth, acceptance of an idea that Iraqi sovereignty can assure protection of communal interests, and robust participation by all factions in provincial and national government.
Iraq, not U.S., will make changes
The deals that will make these compromises possible will take place in an Iraqi way, out of sight of U.S. Westerners, based on tribal and sectional interests that may well seem very strange to U.S. We must remember that Iraqi deals made by customary Iraqi rules have a much better likelihood of lasting than accommodation we try to force on them that looks democratic to U.S. We can only assist by creating safe political environments in which Iraqi’s can meet, bargain, and commit and by keeping the pressure on them, to continue to progress.
The political environment needed to foster those deals depends fundamentally on a safe and secure environment in Iraqi communities. Here’s the rub. Iraq still needs our help in maintaining and improving that security as well as fostering the economic enabler of jobs. Iraqis are not prepared now to do that alone. Plus, even the moderate members of the three factions need pressure from U.S. to keep moving forward. It is often helpful for leaders to be able to argue to their followers that there is an economic incentive in a certain accommodation as well as a need to compromise to avoid some more unpalatable solution forced by the international community.
Continuously improving security and then generating the pressure to impel Iraqis to make deals in their own interest requires boots on the ground. That means enough units in country to continue to grind down al Qaida in Iraq, to counter the activity of Iranian al Quds operators, foreign fighters and militias, and to continue to train, develop, and professionalize Iraqi security forces.
| Rate this story | Low | High |
MORE FROM EXPERTS |
| Add Experts headlines to your news reader: |
Sponsored links
Resource guide






