‘Meet the Press’ transcript for July 22, 2007

Admiral McCONNELL:  I would rather not be specific on eliminating exactly what the techniques are with regard to any, any specific.  When I was in a situation where I had to sign off, as a member of the process, my name to this executive order, I sat down with those who had been trained to do it, the doctors who monitor it, understanding that no one is subjected to torture. They’re, they’re treated in a way that they have adequate diet, not exposed to heat or cold.  They’re not abused in any way.  But I did understand, when exposed to the techniques, how they work and why they work, all under medical supervision.  And one of the things that’s very important, I think, for the American public to know, in the history of this program, it’s been fewer than 100 people.  And so this, this is a program where we capture someone known to be a terrorist, we need information that they possess, and it has saved countless lives.  Because, because they believe these techniques might involve torture and they don’t understand them, they tend to speak to us, talk to us in very—a very candid way.

MR. RUSSERT:  Does this new executive order allow measures that if were used against a U.S. citizen who was apprehended by the enemy would be troubling to the American people?

Admiral McCONNELL:  I can report to you that it’s not torture.

MR. RUSSERT:  How do you fine—define torture?

Admiral McCONNELL:  Well, torture is—an attempt to define torture in the, in the executive order, it gives examples:  mutilation or murder or rape or physical pain, those kinds of things.  Let me just leave it by saying the, the techniques work, it’s not torture.  They’re not subjected to heat or cold, but it is effective.  And it’s a psychological approach to causing someone to have uncertainty and in a situation where they will feel compelled to talk to you about what you’re asking about.

MR. RUSSERT:  And we would find it acceptable if a U.S. citizen experienced the same kind of enhanced interrogation measures?

Admiral McCONNELL:  Tim, it’s not torture.  I would not want a U.S. citizen to go through the process, but it is not tortures, and there would be no permanent damage to that citizen.

MR. RUSSERT:  Let me turn to Iraq, another key judgment from the National Intelligence Estimate.  “We assess that its association with AQI—al-Qaeda in Iraq—helps al-Qaeda to energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources and” “recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for homeland attacks.” That seems to suggest that the Iraq war has been a very effective recruiting tool for al-Qaeda.

Admiral McCONNELL:  It has served as a recruiting tool to draw additional terrorists into Iraq, but it’s a mutually beneficial situation for both organizations.  Now, the debate often is was al-Qaeda in Iraq prior to, to the U.S.-led coalition invasion?  Some members of the—of those who associate with al-Qaeda were there.  Zarqawi, who had served in Pakistan with Osama bin Laden, was the principal lead.  In, in 2004 he swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden.  As you know, he was subsequently killed about a year ago, June 2006. The person that replaced him has sworn allegiance to Osama bin Laden.  So al-Qaeda finds it beneficial in that it—it’s in the press, it draws in recruits, and al-Qaeda in Iraq finds it beneficial because it, it unites in a broader context.

There’s one thing, I think it’s very important, it’s in the NIE but it’s often overlooked.  There is an element of extremism in the Middle East that runs from North Africa down into South Africa into the Levant, to Syria into Iraq and over to Afghanistan, even Pakistan.  What al-Qaeda has done is find a method for uniting that—those extremists views.  And so what we see now is, is groups who are predisposed to extremism and terrorism are uniting, uniting under the al-Qaeda banner.

MR. RUSSERT:  But al-Qaeda is a much more robust and larger presence in Iraq now than it was before the war.

Admiral McCONNELL:  That’s fair to say.  That’s fair to say.  Now, but let me, let me just highlight one thing for you.  This is also important.  At one point in the war, al-Qaeda controlled the huge expanse to the west; it’s called Anbar province.  What’s happened is because of the atrocities in their approach, the leadership, the tribal sheiks in that region, collaborated with the coalition and turned on al-Qaeda.  So is al-Qaeda defeated in Iraq?  No. But in some areas, they’re back on their heels for two reasons:  The local citizens have turned against—Iraqi citizens have turned against al-Qaeda, and the coalition has been much more effective.  As you know, the troops in this surge arrived in about the middle of June, and so the effort has been to take the fight to al-Qaeda, and they have a fairly high level of success in doing that.

MR. RUSSERT:  In terms of the violence in Iraq, which is—which creates more of the violence—which is the greater cause for violence, sectarian conflict or al-Qaeda?

Admiral McCONNELL:  I think it is both.  We—in some cases, we even have Shia on Shia sectarian violence.  But for the most part, it is Sunni vs. Shia.  And al-Qaeda is the, the one that takes—is the organization that attempts purposefully to serve as an accelerant, attacking things like the, the mosque, the grand mosque that was destroyed over a year ago, and then revisiting with attacking the two minarets that were still up.  The whole purpose is something massive against the Shia or against something the Shia holds sacred to act as an accelerant to stimulate, stimulate the violence.

MR. RUSSERT:  But there seems to be, admiral, a coordinated campaign by the administration to elevate al-Qaeda as the threat in Iraq.  And yet the Pentagon quarterly report which came out in March said this:  “‘The conflict in Iraq has changed from a predominantly Sunni-led insurgency against foreign occupation to a struggle for the division of political and economic influence among sectarian groups and organized criminal activity,’ the Pentagon’s quarterly report on Iraq to Congress.

“The Pentagon report also said sectarian violence ‘has become the greatest impediment to the establishment of security and effective governance in Iraq.’” Do you agree with that?

Admiral McCONNELL:  I agree with that.  It is true.  But what I would highlight is al-Qaeda is part of that sectarian violence.  Al-Qaeda is part of that crime.  In some neighborhoods, it’s—it would be a classic shakedown.  “We will provide security if you give us money and resources.” So al-Qaeda is a, is a major portion.  Not the only.  It’s had significant impact, but there are other sectarian disagreements and criminal activity going on.  As I mentioned, even Shia on Shia in some cases.

MR. RUSSERT:  Stephen Hayes has written this book on Vice President Cheney, and, as I was reading it, I found an interview with you about your views of the administration and some of their methods of gathering intelligence.  And I want to share that with you and have you a chance to talk about it.

It says here, “In November of 2006, Michael McConnell, who had been working on intelligence issues in the private sector since resigning from the NSA in” ‘96, “was asked to consider joining the Bush administration as the nation’s top intelligence official.

“McConnell was honored to be asked, but had serious reservations.  He had been unimpressed with many aspects of the Bush administration and its conduct of the war on terror, particularly what he felt was a politicized use of intelligence in the lead-up to the war.

“‘All of these current players, Secretary Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney, and the president,’ McConnell said in an interview in late November ‘06, ‘what’s come through for me as a citizens—I’m no longer on active duty so I can say these things—they had first and foremast very strong political convictions. My sense of it is their political faith and convictions influenced how they took information and interpreted it, how they picked up and interpreted outside events.

“‘As a former intel pro, when you don’t like the answer and you set up your own thing, you tend to get the answer you want.  You hire people who think like you do or want to satisfy the boss.  I’ve read much more about the current set of players and they did set up a whole new interpretation because they didn’t like the answers.  They’ve gotten results that in my view now have been disastrous.’” That’s pretty harsh.

Admiral McCONNELL:  Indeed.  We’re all influenced by what we see and hear and read.  I am a concerned citizen.  I read those things and read those accounts. What I was taking greatest exception to was to have a secondary unit established in the Pentagon to reinterpret information.  And, and the problem I have with that is the way you do intelligence is all sources considered. You have to factor one issue against another and balance it.  If you start an independent effort with a point of view, it’s not infrequent that you would take a single piece of data to make a point as opposed to consider everything.

So what I was referring to and talking about at that time is I was worried that, in the Pentagon, there had been established this separate unit.  And I, I thought it would have been too influential.  Now, you can imagine—I consider myself an intelligence professional.  I’ve been doing this either in—on active duty or serving this community for 40 years.  The first responsibility of an intelligence professional is ground truth, and the second responsibility is to speak truth to power.  So, when I was asked to consider this nomination, that was the condition under which I would consider it.  And I focused on it very intently once I came back.  What I found or what I discovered was quite refreshing.

I—as you know, I meet with the president and vice president six days, and on occasion seven days a week.  That dialogue is, is open and frank and direct. And the thing that the president and the vice president frequently will do, whether talking to me or one of the analysts that go in with me, is that “We’re not telling you what to think or how to think or what your conclusion should be.  We need your information.  We can challenge your assumptions or your assessment, but we want to know what your opinion is.”

MR. RUSSERT:  But leading up to the war in Iraq, you strongly suggest, and many Americans believe, that we went to war on Iraq on faulty intelligence, skewed intelligence, or cherry-picked intelligence.

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