‘Meet the Press’ transcript for May 6, 2007

MR. TENET:  Well, it was his reflection.  I, I interviewed him for the book, and he's talking specifically about terrorism.  You know, he, he, he--when I interviewed him, he said, "You know, it wasn't about fixing intelligence.  My concern was, is when I came over in July, I had a meeting with the vice president's staff, and my concern was the question of how they were thinking about Iraqis--Iraq's relationship with al-Qaeda in, in a way that we just didn't believe was accurate." That's what he was referring to at the time.

MR. RUSSERT:  But do you agree that the vice president's office, the crowd around the vice president, was playing fast and loose with the evidence?

MR. TENET:  There was deep, there was deep disagreement between us, and then throughout this process about how far you could take the terrorism case.  We took a position.  We, we said, very clearly, there are three areas of concern: contact, safe haven and training.  We documented that in a paper in January of 2003, January 28 of 2003.  We also said that, to the best of our knowledge, this may have been no more than two organizations seeking to take advantage of each other, and we could see no complicity, no operational relationship, no command and control between Iraq and al-Qaeda.  Now, therein lied the seeds of a lot of debate back and forth and a lot of tension back and forth.  Our analysts held their ground.  It is what we believed, and it is the case that we made.

MR. RUSSERT:  But October 7, there was a letter written in your name...

MR. TENET:  Yes.

MR. RUSSERT:  ...by John McLaughlin...

MR. TENET:  Right.

MR. RUSSERT:  ...in response to questions raised by Senator Evan Bayh.

MR. TENET:  Right.

MR. RUSSERT:  And it says, "Regarding Senator Bayh's questions of Iraqi links to al-Qaeda, senators could draw from the following points for unclassified discussions.  One, We have solid reporting of senior level contact between Iraq and al-Qaeda going back a decade." Two, "Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal" aggression." Three, "Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad." And lastly, "We have credible reporting that al-Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities.  The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making
conventional bombs."

MR. TENET:  Yes.  And I wish, I wish in that one letter, Tim, we had also put the penultimate judgment.  We didn't in that letter.  You go back to the testimony before those committees, Those judgments were voiced.  You go back to every other paper that we have written, and we made that case.  We believed those points, but we also believed--and everybody in the administration understood--that we never found complicity, authority direction and control, and said that very explicitly.

MR. RUSSERT:  But this is three days before the vote.  And you send that kind of letter, and you say these are talking points you can have, or--for declassified conversation.

MR. TENET:  Right.

MR. RUSSERT:  You're giving the distinct impression that Iraq and September 11 have a connection.

MR. TENET:  Tim, it, it--I understand that, and, and I wish that letter had been completed in the way that it should have been.  I also know that in the statement before all those committees, when I was behind closed doors, we made the necessary closure here to understand the distinction.  We believed those things.  We also never took the case to the point where someone would believe there was an intimate operational relationship between--they were directing each other to undertake activities.

MR. RUSSERT:  At that time, there was a poll in Time magazine, is Saddam involved in September 11 attacks?  Likely, 71; unlikely, 25.  Clearly there was a sense in the country, which was fueled by comments being made by the administration, that there was linkage.  Fair?

MR. TENET:  Well, the polling data would, would tell us that, wouldn't it? All, all I can tell you is, Tim, we were--look, people said--when people say to us, "Well you just, you just allow them--you allowed them to make the case, you've cooked the books." If we were cooking the books, we would have said, "Yes, that's true.  There is authority, direction and control, all your worst fears or concerns." We would have had the secretary of state say that in front of the United Nations.  We didn't.  So there was a--look, was there, was there a history of Saddam Hussein and terrorism?  Were these three areas a source of concern for us?  Maybe--you know, it's a, it's a--it may be a subtle distinction, not so subtle in my mind, particularly when we're dealing with allegations of, you know, Mohamed Atta in Prague milling with the Iraqis. Well, by the spring of 2002, FBI and CIA analysts basically concluded, boy, this story is eroding over the course of time.

MR. RUSSERT:  But the vice president kept talking about that.

MR. TENET:  Well, he may have kept talking about it, Tim.  It was not our, it was not our position. He also said that, you know--he also said that the Weekly Standard wrote a piece in November of 2003 that said this is the best source of your intelligence.  The Weekly Standard piece said this proves there's an operational relationship.  Well, the best standard--the best source is our January 2003 paper.

MR. RUSSERT:  At that time, then, why didn't you stand up and go to the president and vice president and say, "Stop saying this.  It's not true"?

MR. TENET:  Right before the war, Tim, the vice president wanted to give a speech about the Iraq/al-Qaeda relationship that he sent to us for clearance. And I walked in and saw the president of the United States and said, "He can't give this speech.  We will not support this speech." That speech was not given. There's no doubt about where we were on this issue.  Everybody understood where we were, and everybody understood there was no authority, direction, control and complicity.

MR. RUSSERT:  But in terms of correcting the president or the vice president each and every time.

MR. TENET:  Tim, Tim, each and every time.  So was, you know, did I monitor the press every day to see what everybody was saying?  No.  I put a paper on the table.  We put a paper on the table, "This is what the American intelligence community believes." You know, we all have to act within those confines and stay within what the record tells us and what we testify to.

MR. RUSSERT:  And when people deviate from the record, do you...

MR. TENET:  Well, you get--you've got to do your best to correct it.  And when I was aware of it and learned of it, when somebody was going to give a speech, when the vice president was going to give a speech, I walked in and saw the president and said, "He cannot give that speech."

MR. RUSSERT:  You mentioned to "60 Minutes" that it never made any sense of a complicity of Iraq with September 11.  But you did testify in March of '03 that the jury was still out as to whether Saddam was involved.

MR. TENET:  No--well, no, Tim, by, by January, by January of '03, we understood this relationship. We understood that that there was no--there was no relationship between--we, we understood that fairly quickly, Tim.  I mean, I didn't--I mean, I never saw any evidence that told us that there was complicity here.  We understood--you know, we brought the Mohamed Atta story forward.  We ran that down very,very hard.  No complicity with 9/11 ever.

MR. RUSSERT:  Well, in March of '02 you said, "There is no doubt that there have been contacts and linkages of al-Qaeda organization.  As to where we are in September 11, the jury is out."

MR. TENET:  March of '02.

MR. RUSSERT:  Yeah.  As we--as, as to where we are on September 11, the jury's out.

MR. TENET:  Right.

MR. RUSSERT:  "As I said carefully in my statement, it would be a mistake to dismiss the possibility of state sponsorship..."

MR. TENET:  Yes.

MR. RUSSERT:  "...whether Iranian or Iraqi, and we'll see where the evidence takes us."

MR. TENET:  Yes.  That's right, in March of '02, of course, you're running down--at that moment, you have a professional responsibility to run down is there the possibility of complicity here?  You'd be derelict of your responsibility.  I mentioned Iran, and I mentioned Iraq.

MR. RUSSERT:  When did you conclude that Iraq was not complicit in September 11?

MR. TENET:  Tim, when we published--we started publishing in the fall of, of '02, and then by January 28, 2003, our definitive paper is published and we're done.  We're done with that issue.

MR. RUSSERT:  And so any comments suggesting otherwise after that time by the president or vice president were done after you had told them something else?

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