The White House's ‘State of Denial’

Mitchell: What about their dispute of your claim that the administration ignored Paul Bremer's recommendation for more troops?

Woodward: I don't say that in the book. I present what Bremer said and what Bob Blackwell said to Condi Rice and Steve Hadley, who was the Deputy National Security Advisor at the time. There were news reports that picked up on that. And then overstated, but that's not stated in the book.

Mitchell: Let's get to July 10, 2001. It's a critical meeting between George Tenet and Cofer Black when officials go to the White House and surprise Condi Rice to try to get her attention. Give her very little notice that they're coming over to brief her on their concerns about al-Qaida. That there is an attack that's imminent, that something's out there. They don't know where, they don't know when. And you report, I think you quote Cofer Black in saying we had to practically hold a gun to her head.

Woodward: He said, specifically, after the meeting, we did everything but pull the trigger to the gun we were holding to her head. He felt it was strategic warning. And as I report in the book, she felt, well, what do you do? There aren't specific details.

Mitchell: This particular meeting, Tenet apparently thought that she did pay attention. Was it your conclusion that she, maybe, blew them off?

Woodward: Well, I mean, they didn't accelerate their plan. And, again, as I report, they had a covert action plan in the works. What Tenet and Cofer Black were saying is, "We have to do something now. Right now."

Mitchell: Is there any evidence they did anything?

Woodward: Well, they had findings drafted, and so forth. And there was actually one ready. Finding being the presidential order to go get Bin Laden or kill him was sitting on the president's desk on September 10, 2001. So they did...

Mitchell: September 10^th.

Woodward: The day before 9/11.

Mitchell: So, in your reporting, how did Condoleezza Rice react to the warning that she was given?

Woodward: It's a fair question, and there are dual perspectives on this.  They wanted action now. She was working on something. A plan. They said it was, you know, soon. There'd been lots of noise in the intelligence system. But as Cofer Black said, "Some of this is voodoo. Can't really put your finger on it, so you don't know what you've got." They were alarmed. She felt they were working quite rapidly. Now we will find out more about this meeting now that we've learned about it.

Mitchell: The 9/11 Commission never even mentioned it.

Woodward: That's correct.

Mitchell: In their public record.

Woodward: I note that in the book.

Mitchell: Even though, as we've now learned, they were briefed on it.

Woodward: I did not know that.

Mitchell: Condoleezza Rice, she said today, "It's incomprehensible that if I had been given that kind of warning that I would not have responded."

Woodward: You know, all the participants will be able to speak. I did a lot of reporting on this. I've been working on 9/11 since 9/11, for five years. And got to know lots of people involved in this. And I suspect there's more to this.

Mitchell: Jay Garner. Jay Garner comes back. He's removed from his post, leading the Iraq occupation. And he is replaced by Paul Bremer. And he goes to see Rumsfeld. And what does he tell Rumsfeld?

Woodward: This is June 18, 2003. Now think of this, three months into the war. The insurgency really had not taken hold. And he said to Rumsfeld, head-to-head, "We've made three tragic mistakes. Not just mistakes, but tragic mistakes. "They are disbanding the Iraqi army," which as I report in the book, is contrary to what the briefings to Bush were. They were going to keep the Iraqi army for border patrol and other things. The second tragic mistake was getting rid of members of the Baath party who were in the government to such a level that you kicked the top 50,000 people out of the Iraqi government. And the third was disbanding this interim governing counsel that Garner had set up to put an Iraqi face on the occupation. Bremer came in and said, "We're sovereign," and those people went home. And Rumsfeld's response was, you know, kind of, "Really? Three tragic mistakes? And Garner pressed and outlined his case. And then Bremer said something that really was important. "It's not too late. We can reverse those decisions." And Rumsfeld said, "Well, they're already made. It's too late."

Mitchell: It's too late. And this was 2003.

Woodward: Summer of 2003. And the history now shows, you know, maybe it wasn't too late.

Mitchell: Garner then goes to the Oval Office and doesn't tell the president any of his concerns.

Woodward: That's correct. And they have kind of a, you know, nice chat and tell war stories. And Garner tells the president how popular he -- President Bush -- is in Iraq. And I quizzed Garner on this at length. Because it was baffling to me that somebody could tell the secretary of defense three tragic mistakes, and go meet with the president and not just find a way to say, "I just told Secretary Rumsfeld we made three tragic mistakes." Garner's argument -- and this is part of the problem with the military, and the retired military, and people who just don't get in other people's faces -- was, "Well, I told Rumsfeld. And if I told the president everyone would kind of think I was, you know, they should have removed me sooner." And it's all a case, and we now look at Jay Garner and his tenure, and he had the right ideas.

Mitchell: In fact, what did he tell the president before the war? And just how many troops were needed and how they should proceed?

Woodward: Yeah, I have here a document which I'll be happy to give you.  It says, "To the president. NSC, talking points for an NSC presentation.  28 February, 2003." And I have the notes -- and this is in the book -- of what happened at this meeting. And Garner told them, very plainly -- "You've assigned me nine tasks. Four of the hard ones I can't do." He had 200 people working for him. And no one commented. No one asked any questions.

Mitchell: He said he needed more people.

Woodward: Yeah, well, he did say he needed more people. But he said the task of stabilizing Iraq, the task of finding WMD, he couldn't do. He didn't have enough people. Now this is three weeks before the war. No one asks anything, no one does anything.

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