The White House's ‘State of Denial’

NBC Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Andrea Mitchell sat down with journalist and author Bob Woodward on Oct. 2 in Washington. What follows is the complete transcript of their conversation, edited only for readability.

Andrea Mitchell: How is it possible that people involved in the search for weapons of mass destruction were aware -- even before the invasion -- that they was a possibility that there weren't any weapons?

Bob Woodward: My assistant Bill Murphy got the war diary and these are excerpts from the diary kept by Gen. Spider Marks. [He] was the two-star general on the ground in Kuwait -- in charge of finding weapons of mass destruction -- when the invasion came. You see from his contemporaneous diary, he kept saying we're on our ass. It doesn't look like the intelligence is any good. Told all the top generals, "I have doubts. I can't prove to you or I don't believe that there's WMD at any particular site."

Mitchell: Did anyone tell Donald Rumsfeld?

Woodward: Well, what's fascinating -- at the time -- October 15, 2002, five months before the war, Rumsfeld wrote a secret memo saying these are the 29 things that could go wrong in the war. Item 13 was we may not find WMD on the ground. So you have the general on the ground and the Secretary of Defense immersed in doubt and concern. They never talked. They never got the issue on the cable and there was just this belief -- geez, it looks good.

Mitchell: And nobody talked to each about the fact that there might not be weapons of mass destruction which was the reason for invading?  The stated reason for invading?

Woodward: Exactly. When you look at this diary and go through the record and Rumseld's memo, what was happening is they were saying, looking at satellite photos, communication intercepts and so forth.  It's tragic.

Mitchell: Donald Rumsfeld, central character in your book. You describe him as running over Hugh Shelton and other of his commanders. Arrogant.  Was he a take charge guy -- exactly what was needed -- or was he out of control, almost a Captain Queeg character?

Woodward: Well, I stick to the specific incidents and lots of the generals and lots of the people who dealt with him, including people in the Bush White House like Andy Card, Condi Rice and so forth, have their difficulties with him. Rumsfeld is very smart, self confident, sure of himself. The problem I found in the research here is he bleached out in the uniform military anyone who would come in and be strong and independent. So you have a lot of yes men. Or, in the sense, a lot of parrots sitting on his shoulder -- repeating what he says and repeating his view. And -- again, the sadness in all of this is you need strong military leaders. You need people who will go in -- you need the Pattons and the MacArthurs. Yes, they're hard to deal with. But they have a view and they don't fade away and kind of do, "yes, sir."

Mitchell: But was he so wrong when, early on, he said I need to know information in real time? I can't hear it second-hand because I have the responsibility in the chain of command to tell the President of the United States if something's wrong.

Woodward: I think -- and much of this seems right -- that the military that he inherited kind of thought they were in charge and there was not sufficient civilian control of the military. It's a fascinating portrait of somebody going in, trying to fix things and in the process, stepping on so many toes and kicking so many heads that there is this kind of alienation. So people would not come in and say, "come on, look, you're wrong." Now he insists, in fairness, that that happens. I spent two and a half years trying to find an incident and I was unable to.

Mitchell: An incident where somebody would go in and tell him he's wrong and persuade him to have an open mind about something?

Woodward: Yeah. I mean, he changed his mind some. But, I mean, really pushed the limit. We often talk in our business that all good work is done in defiance of management. You have to be tough with management.

Mitchell: So, arguably, Vernon Clark went in and told him what he didn't want to hear and didn't get the job as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Woodward: That's right. This is Admiral Vernon Clark, who was head of the Navy. And it looked like he was on the road to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. His predecessor, Hugh Shelton, who was chairman, recommended him to Rumsfeld. Said this is the person who can stand up to Don Rumsfeld.  Interestingly enough, Clark, in interviews with Bush and Cheney, said, "Look, you have to worry about getting rosy scenarios from the military.  You need military officers that are respected for their independence and their strength." And when he talked to Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld didn't want to deal with somebody that tough minded, that independent.

Mitchell: What did your reporting show was the relationship between Condoleezza Rice and Don Rumsfeld?

Woodward: Well, Condi Rice gets along with almost everyone. And she says she gets along with Rumsfeld but it's been hard. I report there were occasions when he would not return her phone calls. He's Secretary of Defense. She's the National Security Advisor at this point. And she complained and the President actually had to go to Rumsfeld. Had to talk to him and say-- "Don, you need to return Condi's phone calls." He did, according to the witnesses I had, in a kind of teasing way. Just think about that. The National Security Advisor is the President's representative, the coordinator, [and she] can't get phone calls returned?

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