MR. RICKS: That was one of the surprises to me in reporting the book, that Shinseki had had his staff go and talk to historians, looked at other occupations and come up with a very concrete estimate based on historical precedent of how many troops might be needed. And he concluded several hundred thousand. The Bush administration saw that as an attempt to actually stop the invasion because they really came to distrust the Army because the Army was coming up with all these objections and doubts and saying things like this is not really—or invading Iraq would not be part of the war on terror. And ultimately, the joint chiefs of staff sent out an order saying you will consider an invasion of Iraq part, part of the war on terror.

MR. RUSSERT: You said that General Tommy Franks, who was in head of the initial invasion of the war, used the phrase “speed kills” in terms of supporting a lower force than Shinseki had talked about. Talk about Franks, what he recommended, and the effectiveness of that initial invasion as opposed to the occupation.

MR. RICKS: Another surprise to me in writing this was that I think this probably was one of the worst war plans in American history. When you talked to people who had to implement it, they said it didn’t speak to the basic problem. All the energy went to how you get to Baghdad, which was the easy part of it. Very little thought went to what do you do after you get there. So they spent 90 percent of their time on 10 percent of the problem. And they had a war plan that was effectively a kind of a banana republic coup d’etats: decapitate the Iraqi regime. When actually the plan that they were supposed to do was supposed to change Iraq and change the Middle East. So the war plan really didn’t speak to what top authorities, the president, had asked them to do.

MR. RUSSERT: Donald Rumsfeld, when the first looting was shown on the TV screens criticized the media for showing the pictures over and over again. He said that, “Stuff happens.” That sometimes these things are untidy—freedom’s untidy. And then there was a debate between Rumsfeld and the press corps as to whether we were involved in a guerilla warfare. You said that Secretary Rumsfeld was paralyzed when the looting began. Talk about that.

MR. RICKS: This would have been, I think, the time when Rumsfeld’s forceful personality really could’ve helped if he’d come in in this late spring and early summer of 2003 and said, “This is different from what we thought it was going to be.” But what I heard from officials who were at the CPA, the American Occupation Authority, was there was kind of a paralysis at the top, that they couldn’t get Rumsfeld to change, couldn’t get him to adjust, couldn’t even get him to say yes, we are fighting a war. And so for about eight weeks, a crucial time early in the occupation, June and July, you really have the U.S. military frozen in place because it’s a hierarchical institution. And the guy at the top was not adjusting to changed circumstances.

MR. RUSSERT: You end the book by saying that history will determine whether the president was correct in saying that the invasion will make our country more secure. Right now you have doubts.

MR. RICKS: I have real doubts because while there’s a small chance, I think, that Iraq ultimately will become a stable pro-American democracy, I think there’s a much larger chance that it won’t. And I think it’s an extremely worrisome situation. We kind of have a low-level civil war there. If it becomes a more intensible war, it easily could spill over its own borders and across the Middle East and we’d have a regional war on our hands.

MR. RUSSERT: But you do not think American troops should withdraw immediately.

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MR. RICKS: I think it would be irresponsible to go in there and do what we’ve done and then walk away from it. There’s a lot of Iraqis out there who have committed their lives to helping the Americans do something there. And to abandon those people, I think, would be absolutely shameful as well.

MR. RUSSERT: How long do you think we’ll be there?

MR. RICKS: Ten to 15 years, at least.

MR. RUSSERT: At what size force?

MR. RICKS: I think they’ll probably get it down to maybe 110,000 by the end of this year, and probably 50,000 by the end of next year. And then you could have a steady stay for five or 10 years, even 15 years, but I think it’s going to be a long, hard struggle.

MR. RUSSERT: Tom Ricks. The book, “Fiasco: the American Military Adventure in Iraq.” We thank you for sharing your views.

MR. RICKS: Thank you.

MR. RUSSERT: Coming next: our MEET THE PRESS MINUTE. The first White House chief of staff to ever appear on MEET THE PRESS 50 years ago, Sherman Adams, from Ike Eisenhower’s administration.

(Announcements)

MR. RUSSERT: And we are back.

Sixteen White House chiefs of staff have appeared on MEET THE PRESS. The first, former New Hampshire Governor Sherman Adams, who served President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

(Videotape, November 4, 1956):

MR. NED BROOKS: Welcome once again to MEET THE PRESS. Our guest is the assistant to the president, Mr. Sherman Adams. As the chief of staff to the president, Mr. Adams attends the sessions of the Cabinet and the National Security Council as well as meetings with political leaders.

MR. LAWRENCE SPIVAK: Governor Adams, on that, as you know, it’s been frequently charged that you are the most powerful member of the president’s, president’s official family, and that you’re the second-most powerful man in Washington next to the president. Can you tell us how much truth there is, if any, in that charge?

MR. SHERMAN ADAMS: I don’t know, Mr. Spivak, how I should answer a question like that...

MR. SPIVAK: Well, let me ask you...

MR. ADAMS: ...but let me answer it in the negative.

OFFSCREEN VOICE: (Unintelligible).

MR. SPIVAK: All right. Let me ask you this. Yes. May I then put this:

Now, who decides—do you decide what should and should not be taken up with the president? Because that, too, the charge has been made that through a process of selection, you can decide what comes before the president, and what, therefore, is decided.

MR. ADAMS: I don’t carry out policy, I see that policy is carried out. I don’t make policy, the president makes policy and the people in his official family.

Now so far as I’m concerned, my job is to get the things done as to which the president has already made decisions. I don’t arrogate to myself decisions that belong to the president of the United States. And all this business about being powerful and, and being the most influential person in Washington amuses me a little bit, because if that’s so, that simply adds to the president’s accomplishments, I assure you, because I, I do what I believe he wants me to do.

(End videotape)

MR. RUSSERT: Sherman Adams was the longest-serving White House chief of staff in history: five years, nine months, one day.

MR. ADAMS: (From file footage) I have tendered my resignation.

MR. RUSSERT: He resigned under political pressure on September 22^nd, 1958, after allegations he accepted expensive gifts in exchange for aiding textile magnate Bernard Goldfine during his troubles with the Security & Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.

Adams then returned to his native New Hampshire, where he established the Loon Mountain Ski Resort. He died in 1986 at age 87.

And we’ll be right back.

(Announcements)

MR. RUSSERT: And that’s all for today. We’ll be back next week. If it’s Sunday, it’s MEET THE PRESS.

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