GEN. CASEY: I use the world “fairly substantial.” I don’t think we’re done it and I didn’t put a time, time frame on it. But we, we’ve made one, one decision and as—when we announce that decision, what I said was that I would review the situation periodically and I’d make recommendations to the secretary of defense and to the president on what I need here to get my job done. And I do expect, again, assumptions holding, that we will continue this process through 2006.

MR. RUSSERT: Former Prime Minister Allawi said yesterday that Iraq is in civil war. Is he correct?

GEN. CASEY: The prime minister’s been out of, the former prime minister’s been out of the country, Tim. I haven’t talked to him about the security situation in, in a while, frankly. But I don’t, I don’t think he’s correct. As you can imagine, we look at this very closely, and I, I do not believe, one, that we are in a civil war right now; two, nor do I believe that a civil war is imminent or necessarily inevitable.

Now, is the situation here fragile because of the increased tensions and sectarian tensions and increased levels of violence that are sectarian—of a sectarian nature and because of the forming of the government? That’s absolutely right and I don’t want to, I don’t want to sugar-coat it, the situation here is fragile and I suspect it will remain fragile here until we get a new government, a government of national unity formed. But I don’t think—and that is—I said publicly previously, I don’t think we’re at, at the point of civil war yet.

MR. RUSSERT: But you also said, General, when asked whether or not Iraq could fall into civil war, “Anything can happen.” You still have that view?

GEN. CASEY: Sure, Tim. I mean, we’re, we’re at war here, and in war anything can happen. And so while there’s always a possibility of that. Again, I don’t, I don’t see it happening certainly anytime, anytime in, in the near term here.

MR. RUSSERT: Let me show you the Los Angeles Times. “The top U.S. envoy to Iraq said that the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime had opened a ‘Pandora’s box’ of volatile ethnic and sectarian tensions that could engulf the region in all-out war if America pulled out of the country too soon. In remarks that were among the frankest and bleakest public assessments of the Iraq situation by a high-level American official, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad said the ‘potential is there’ for sectarian violence to become full-blown civil war.” Seems to be quite blunt.

GEN. CASEY: I think, I think it’s right, but I think it’s pretty much the same thing I said. Certainly there is, there is sectarian violence and tensions here in Iraq, and anything is possible. And, and so I, I think we’re both, we’re both saying the same thing. The, the other thing, I think it’s clear that, as, as I mentioned, the leaders of Iraq are now discussing how to form a government that will represent the interests and, and rights of all the different ethnic and sectarian groups in Iraq. And that’s something they haven’t had to do before. It’s something that, for 35 years under Saddam Hussein, he ran the show. And so they’re, they’re wrestling with some pretty difficult issues that, that I’m—my sense is that they will resolve, but it’s just going to take some time.

MR. RUSSERT: On Tuesday, “President Bush vowed for the first time to turn over most of Iraq to newly trained Iraqi troops by the end of this year, setting a specific benchmark as he kicked off a fresh drive to reassure Americans alarmed by the recent burst of sectarian violence. ... As more capable Iraqi police and soldiers come on line, they will assume responsibility for more territory with the goal of having the Iraqis control more territory than the coalition by the end of 2006.”

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When the Democrats suggested last year setting a timetable, the president and others said that would send the wrong message to the enemy. Why have things changed?

GEN. CASEY: Tim, I don’t, I don’t see what the president said about passing off parts of Iraq to the Iraqi security forces as a timetable. What the president said has, has been our strategy all along. And what we’re starting to see now as these forces develop and we, we start getting our monthly assessment, and we continue to get our monthly assessments into their progress, they are getting more and more capable. And for example, I would estimate that, that three quarters of the Iraqi army brigades would be capable of assuming the lead in, in an area of Iraq by the end of the summer. And I think probably eight of 10 of the Iraqi divisions, army divisions, will be there by end of the year. And, and we have shifted some resources and some focus to the police so that we can enhance the capabilities of the local police. So you have Iraqi local police backed up by Iraqi national police and Iraqi army forces that will be responsible for maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq for a safe haven for terror. That’s always been the strategy. I think he’s putting a, a, a benchmark out there for us—and it certainly is a very achievable benchmark—but I don’t see it as a timetable at all.

MR. RUSSERT: Well—but the whole purpose of turning over the territory to the Iraqis is so that American troops can go home, correct?

GEN. CASEY: It is, Tim, but I think it’s, it’s very—it’s important here that we understand the distinction. When we put them in the lead, they are in the lead with—still with our transition team, teams, and still with some enabling support from us—medical evacuation, some, some logistical support for a period of time, intelligence, indirect fire support, those, those types of things. So, so they’re not to the point where they are completely independent and completely able to conduct the counterinsurgency operations by themselves. We still will provide them some level of support as they’re doing this. And so what you will see is a gradual reduction in the coalition forces as the Iraqi security forces take more and more of the security responsibilities.

MR. RUSSERT: General, in November of 2005, you said this: “What the Iraqis need is time. They need a few more years to work through their differences. Our presence here gives them that time. It’s the gradual nature of this that will allow the process to stay on track and not degenerate.” In all honesty, it will take several more years of major American presence in order for this to happen, correct?

GEN. CASEY: It, it depends how you define major American presence. I see a couple more years of this, with a gradually reducing coalition presence here in Iraq as, as I said, as the Iraqi security forces step forward. What the, the long term nature of our presence here might be is a subject for a discussion with the new government of Iraq.

MR. RUSSERT: When the war was being planned, it was thought that Americans could go into Iraq, change the government and largely get out. A new book, “Cobra II,” says that in April of 2003, General Tommy Franks said to draw up plans to have just 30,000 American troops on the ground at the end of 2003. Did you ever imagine that three years into the war there would still be 130,000 Americans on the ground after sustaining 2300 American deaths and 17,000 American injuries?

GEN. CASEY: Did I ever imagine? I, I certainly couldn’t come up with a number of 130,000, but did I think that there would be a fairly substantial U.S. presence here for a period of time after the war ended? I have some experience in Bosnia, in the, in Kosovo, and my sense was that we would be here in a fairly good number for a period of time. But I, I wouldn’t want to—I couldn’t put a specific number on it for you.

MR. RUSSERT: Did you imagine that the insurgency would be as bloody and robust as it is?

CONTINUED

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