Highlights of House report on Katrina

updated 10:33 a.m. ET Feb. 15, 2006

WASHINGTON - The House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina issued its 520-page report on its investigation of the Aug. 29 storm and its aftermath.  Here are some highlights:

Levees:
The levees were designed to resist a standard hurricane, roughly Level 3, but not the most severe hurricanes. There is no actual "standard hurricane," however, because of the unique factors that contribute to a particular storm, including its exact path.

"The reasons for the levee failures appear to be some combination of nature's wrath (the storm was just too large) and man's folly (an assumption that the design, construction, and maintenance of the levees would be flawless). ... There was a failure of initiative to get beyond design and organizational compromises to improve the level of protection afforded."

"No one is in charge," one scientist told investigators. "You have got multiple agencies, multiple organizations, some of whom aren't on speaking terms with each other, sharing responsibilities for public safety."

Evacuations:
Mandatory evacuations ordered in Alabama and Mississippi and for the general population in Louisiana -- excluding New Orleans and Jefferson Parish -- went relatively well. "Those individuals in all states who had the means to evacuate, but did not do so, must also share the blame for the incomplete evacuation and the difficulties that followed."

Despite adequate warning 56 hours before landfall, Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin delayed ordering a mandatory evacuation in New Orleans until 19 hours before landfall. Evacuations in New Orleans and Jefferson Parish were either declared late or not at all, a failure that "led to preventable deaths, great suffering and further delays in relief."

In New Orleans, city officials failed to evacuate or assist in the evacuation of more than 70,000 people who were in the city when the storm hit. The Superdome was inadequately prepared for the large number of evacuees housed there.

"The incomplete evacuation and floodwaters also required a post-hurricane evacuation, for which federal, state and city officials had not prepared. Because of a lack of preparations, planning had to be accomplished in emergency circumstances, where communications and situational awareness were in short supply."

At least 35 of the 215 nursing home and hospital deaths in New Orleans were due to bad decisions not to evacuate, and faulted chaos and lack of access to medical records for delayed care to countless others.

Rumors and false media reports:
Rampant false media reports contributed to unnecessary disorder and delay that hindered the recovery. There were repeated broadcast reports on Sept. 1 that evacuations at the Superdome had been suspended because of shots fired at a helicopter, and unsubstantiated reports of two babies with throats slit. No bullet holes were ever found in the choppers and the shooting reports most likely involved trapped individuals firing in the air to attract the attention of rescuers.

The reports contributed to unnecessary anxiety at the Superdome and scared away truck drivers and others who could have otherwise provided relief efforts and supplies.

At least 1,000 FEMA workers set to arrive in New Orleans on Aug. 31 also were turned away due to security concerns.

"First the levees were breached and then law and order. As Katrina left people scrambling for food, for water, for supplies for survival lawlessness and violence, both real and imagined, spread, creating yet another problem for authorities who were burdened enough already."

Red Cross:
The Red Cross was dependent on Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Defense Department for supplies and was unable to fill the void with supplies and staffing as those agencies scrambled to respond.

The lead relief agency in the disaster, the Red Cross was aware of crowding at the Superdome but was unable to staff that and other locally operated shelters because its workers were denied access.

When the Red Cross placed orders for food such as Meals-Ready-to-Eat through the government, many of the requests got lost in an overburdened FEMA computer system.

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